鈥淢ortgage Design in an Equilibrium Model of the Housing Market鈥�听
By Arvind Krishnamurthy, Timothy James McQuade, Adam Guren
Journal of Finance.听
2020,听Vol. Forthcoming
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How can mortgages be redesigned to reduce housing market volatility, consumption volatility, and default? How does mortgage design interact with monetary policy? We answer these questions using a quantitative equilibrium life cycle model with aggregate shocks, long-term mortgages, and an equilibrium housing market, focusing on designs that index payments to monetary policy. Designs that raise mortgage payments in booms and lower them in recessions do better than designs with xed mortgage payments. The bene ts are quantitatively substantial: In a simulated crisis under a monetary regime in which the central bank lowers real interest rates in a bust, house prices fall 2.24 percentage points less, 23 percent fewer households default, and consumption falls by 0.79 percentage points less with ARMs relative to FRMs. Among de signs that reduce payments in a bust, we show that those that front-load the payment reductions and concentrate them in recessions outperform designs that spread payment reductions over the life of the mortgage. Front-loading alleviates household liquidity constraints in states where they are most binding, reducing default and stimulating housing demand by new homeowners. To isolate this channel, we compare an FRM with a built-in option to be converted to an ARM with an FRM with an option to be re nanced at the prevailing FRM rate. Under these two contracts, the present value of a lender鈥檚 loan falls by roughly an equal amount, but the FRM that can be converted to an ARM, which front loads payment reductions, reduces the declines in prices and consumption six times as much, and reduces default three times as much.
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